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ARTICLES
DAMAGES RECOVERABLE FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
Stuart L. Craig*

T

HE Virginia Legislature at the 1968 session of the General Assembly
amended Section 8-636 of the Code of Virginia and thereby altered
drastically both the amount and the method of distribution of damages
recoverable under Virginia's Wrongful Death Act.' Only the section dealing with damages and the distribution thereof was altered, but the amendment changed substantially those entitled to an award of damages for
financial or pecuniary loss and the conditions prerequisite to recovery for
such loss.
Prior to its amendment in 1968,2 Section 8-636 provided that the jury
might award, "such damages as to it may seem fair and just, not exceeding
forty thousand dollars." As amended,' Section 8-636 provides for an award
of the following:
Judge, Corporation Court of Danville, Virginia. B.A., Dartmouth, 1949; LL.B., Virginia, 1952.
1

VA. CoDE ANN. § 8-633 to -640 (Cum.Supp. 1970).
§ 8-636 (Cum.Supp. 1966):
The jury in any such action may award such damages as to it may seem fair
and just, not exceeding forty thousand dollars, and may direct in what proportion
they shall be distributed to the surviving widow or husband and children and
grandchildren of the deceased, or if there be none such, then to the parents,
brothers and sisters of the deceased. Nothing shall be apportioned to the parents,
brothers and sisters of the deceased, if there be a surviving widow or husband,
children or grandchildren, but between members of the same class the jury shall
have absolute discretion as to who shall receive the whole or any part of the
recovery. The maximum amount of damages that may be awarded under this
section in the amount of fifty thousand dollars shall not apply to any cause of
action arising prior to July one, nineteen hundred sixty-six.
3
VA. CODE ANN.§ 8-636 (Cum. Supp. 1970):
The jury in any such action may award such damages for solace as to it may
seem fair and just, not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars, and may direct in
what proportion they shall be distributed to the surviving widow or husband and
children and grandchildren of the deceased, or if there be none such, then to the
parents, brothers and sisters of the deceased. Nothing shall be apportioned to
the parents, brothers and sisters of the deceased, if there be a surviving widow
or husband, children or grandchildren, but between members of the same class
the jury shall have absolute discretion as to who shall receive the whole or any
part of the recovery. In addition to the recovery above, in every such action,
the personal representative of the deceased person shall be entitled to recover
the actual funeral expenses of the decedent, not exceeding five hundred dollars,
and the actual hospital, medical and ambulance service expenses incurred by the

2 VA.CoDE ANN.
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1. Such damages for solace as to the jury may seem fair and just, not
exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars.
2. Actual funeral expenses of the decedent, not exceeding five hundred
dollars, and the actual hospital, medical, and ambulance service expenses
incurred.
3. Such further damages, not exceeding fifty thousand dollars as shall
equal the financial or pecuniary loss sustained by the dependent or dependents of the decedent.
The purpose of this article will be to review and discuss the historical
background, development and interpretation of the Virginia statutes providing for recovery in actions for wrongful death, to analyze the changes
wrought by the 1968 amendment to Section 8-636, and to examine the
situation now facing counsel and the court in the trial of a wrongful death
action in Virginia. Several amendments to Section 8-636 proposed to and
rejected by the General Assembly during its 1970 session will be reviewed.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

At common law, there was no civil remedy provided in cases of wrongful

death.' There was no cause of action by or on behalf of the survivors of a
deceased to recover for the loss sustained by them as a result of his death,

and the decedent's estate was without a cause of action for loss to it resulting from his death. The reasons behind the rule are not entirely clear.'
decedent as a result of the wrongful act. Any recovery hereunder, of the
funeral expenses and hospital, medical and ambulance service expenses shall be
expended by the personal representative in the payment of such expenses, the
funds available for payment of hospital, medical and ambulance service expenses
being apportioned pro rata among such specific creditors, as their respective
interests may appear. In addition to the damages set forth above, the jury may
award such further damages, not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, as shall equal
the financial or pecuniary loss sustained by the dependent or dependents of
such decedent and shall further direct in what proportion such damages shall be
distributed to such dependents, regardless of class.
No recovery hereunder shall be deemed to be assets of the estate of the
decedent and the court shall apportion the costs of recovery as it shall deem
proper.
Such damages for funeral expenses, solace and such additional damages for
medical and hospital expenses and pecuniary loss that may be awarded under
this section shall not apply to any cause of action arising prior to July one,
nineteen hundred sixty-eight.
4
See 3 W. HOLDSWORH, A HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 333-36 (3d ed. 1923); 22 AM.
JUR. 2d Death § 44 (1965); See also Mozingo v. Consolidated Constr. Co., 171 F. Supp.
396 (E.D. Va. 1959).

5
25A C.J.S. Death § 13 (1966); 22 AM. JUR. 2d Death § 1 (1965); 16 AM. JUR. Death
§ 48 (1938).
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Perhaps it derived from the proposition that personal actions die with the
person, from the theory that the life of a freeman cannot be evaluated
in terms of money, or from the doctrine that where the wrongful acts constitute a crime, the civil wrong is merged in the crime and extinguished.6
Historically, the origin of the rule may have evolved because of the
criminal nature and origin of actions for wrongful death. At one point
in England a penalty for wrongfully or negligently causing another's death
was forfeiture to the crown of all goods and chattels of the wrongdoer,
which effectively eliminated any need for or benefit to be gained by a civil
action on behalf of the decedent's survivors.
The case law precedent for the rule was established in the early English
case of Baker v. Bolton.' The bereaved husband and unsuccessful plaintiff
had lost his wife in a stagecoach accident and subsequently brought suit
to recover for his loss. Unfortunate dictum in the case created the decisional basis for a harsh and inequitable rule. In his opinion, Lord Ellenborough held, without citing controlling authority or precedent, that a
husband had no cause of action for the loss of his wife's services, declaring
that in a civil court "the death of a human being could not be complained
of as an injury."
The rule of Baker v. Bolton not only became the law in England, it soon
became firmly entrenched and accepted in this country.8 Severe criticism
of the unjustness of the rule was frequent. In Rowe v. Richards,9 the court
expressed the following dissatisfaction with it:
With the evolution of modem industry, resulting as it did in frequent
deaths from negligence, the injustice of the rule of the common law
became impressed upon the leaders of thought, and, from a realization
of its injustice to a recognition of the utter unsoundness of the reasons
urged in support thereof was but a short and natural step. The thinking
mind could not help but recognize that the then established rule presented 'a glaring absurdity in allowing a husband and father, if injured,
but not killed, a right of action for the recovery of the damages thus
sustained, and denying to his widow and children any compensation for
the damages inflicted upon them, should the injury be greater and result
in his death.' 1o
0

See Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342 (1937).
1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
8 See Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1877).
9 35 S.D. 201, 151 N.W. 1001 (1915).
10 Id. at 203, 151 N.W. at 1003.
7
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Relief in England arrived in 1846 in the form of the Fatal Accidents
Act, more commonly known and referred to as Lord Campbell's Act,1
which created a statutory cause of action for wrongful death. Recovery
was limited to designated beneficiaries and damages were awarded based
upon the pecuniary loss to those surviving. The jury was permitted to "give
such damages as they may think proportionate to the injury." Under the
English Act, it was necessary to aver for whose benefit the suit was instituted
and prosecuted, 2 and there could be no recovery in the absence of actual
pecuniary injury. 3

II.

THE VIRGINIA WRONGFUL DEATH ACTS

Several types of statutes have been enacted in this country, each providing a remedy for death by wrongful or negligent acts. Some are survival
statutes which do not create a new cause of action but prevent an abatement of the deceased's claim. Others, such as those patterned after Lord
Campbell's Act, create a new cause of action on behalf of designated beneficiaries who have suffered pecuniary loss. Still another method of providing
relief is by the enactment of a wrongful death act granting a new right
of action on behalf of the deceased's estate rather than a new cause of
action.' 4 Under such acts, recovery of damages is measured by the loss to
the estate and is not conditioned upon there being persons who survive the
deceased who have suffered financial or pecuniary loss.
119 & 10 Vict., ch. 93 (1846).
12 Matthews v. Warner, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 570 (1877); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v.
Wightman, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 431 (1877), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Baltimore
& Ohio R.R. v. Koontz, 104 U.S. 5 (1881).
'3 Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Noell, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 394 (1879). The statutes of
some states are patterned after Lord Campbell's Act and require proof of actual
pecuniary loss. Such was the situation in North Carolina prior to the 1969 amendment
to its Wrongful Death Statute. See Scriven v. McDonald, 264 N.C. 727, 142 S.E.2d
585 (1965); Armentrout v. Hughes, 247 N.C. 631, 101 S2E.2d 793 (1958).
14 For some time, controversy has existed as to whether or not a new cause of action
or a new right of action was created by the Virginia Statute. Grady v. Irvine,
254 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 819 (1958); Sherley v. Lotz, 200 Va.
173, 104 S.E.2d 795 (1958); Note, Death by Wrongful Act and Survival of Personal
Injury Actions in Virginia, 38 VA. L. REv. 959 (1952). The majority and better view
appears to be the right of action (remedy) is totally new but arises from the same
cause of action (wrong) that was created by the original actionable tort and is
dependent upon the character of the wrong and subject to its defenses and infirmities.
Wilson v. Whittaker, 207 Va. 1032, 154 S.E.2d 124 (1967); Hoffman v. Stuart, 188
Va. 785, 51 S.E.2d 239 (1949); Street v. Consumers Mining Corp., 185 Va. 561, 39
S.E.2d 271 (1946); 25A C.J.S. Death § 15 (1966). See also Reynolds v. Willis, 209 A.2d
760 (Del. 1965); Burke v. Burnham, 97 N.H. 203, 84 A.2d 918 (1951).
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The Virginia Legislature enacted the State's first wrongful death act
on January 14, 1871."5 It deprived wrongdoers and tortfeasors of their
common law immunity by permitting an action to be brought in the name
of the personal representative of the deceased. The codified sections of the
act, which were included in the 1887 Code, relating to damages and the
distribution thereof provided:
Sec. 2903. How and when to be brought; how damages awarded;
new trials.--Every such action shall be brought by and in the name of
the personal representative of such deceased person, and within twelve
months after his or her death. The jury in any such action may award
such damages as to it may seem fair and just, not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and may direct in what proportion they shall be distributed
to the wife, husband, parent and child of the deceased. But nothing in
this section shall be construed to deprive the court of the power to grant
new trials, as in other cases.
Sec. 2904. To whom amount recovered to be paid.-The amount
recovered in any such action shall, after the payment of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, be paid to the wife, husband, parent, and child
of the deceased, in such proportion as the jury may have directed, or,
if they have not directed, according to the statute of distributions, and
shall be free from all debts and liabilities of the deceased; but if there
be no wife, husband, parent, or child, the amount so received shall be
assets in the hands of the personal representative, to be disposed of
according to law.
From 1871 until 1968 the above sections of the Virginia Act underwent
a number of amendments and recodifications,"6 but their basic provisions
with respect to the recovery and distribution of damages remained intact
until 1968. Some changes were made in the designation of beneficiaries and
in the amount of damages recoverable. In 1904, the parents, brothers and
sisters were placed in a deferred class and allowed to share in the absence
of primary beneficiaries, and it was provided that where the deceased left
a widowed mother and also a widow but no children the damages should
be divided between the mother and the widow." In 1920 grandchildren

15 Va. Acts of Assembly 1870-71, ch. 29, at 27; VA. CODE §§ 2902-06 (1887).
1B Section 2903 and 2904 of the Code of Va. (1887) became Sections 5787 and 5788
of the Code of Va. (1919 and 1942) and Sections 8-634 to 8-638 of the 1950 Code. For
a capsule history of the Virginia Wrongful Death Act, see Hudson Motor Car Co. v.
Hertz,
121 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 696 (1941).
17
Va. Acts of Assembly 1904, ch. 64, at 110.
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were added to the preferred class of beneficiaries with the provision regarding a division between a widowed mother and widow only applying in the
absence of both children and grandchildren. 8 The statutory limit of
damages increased gradually from $10,000 in 1871 to $15,000 in 1942,
$25,000 in 1952, $30,000 in 1958, $35,000 in 1962 and to $40,000 in
1966. Although the amount recoverable was raised, damages continued
to be allocated in such manner as the jury deemed fair and just. The Virginia statute in all its modifications continued to make it clear that no
recovery was subject to the debts or liabilities of the deceased and that,
in the absence of named beneficiaries in either the deferred or preferred
class, any award was to be considered assets in the hands of the personal
representatives to be disposed of according to law. In other words, in the
absence of named beneficiaries, more remote next-of-kin were allowed to
share in the recovery.' The 1968 amendment to Section 8-6362" did not
disturb the designation of named beneficiaries but limited their participation
to an award for solace in the amount of twenty-five thousand dollars. The
main significance of the amendment was that it created a new class consisting of the surviving dependents of the deceased who were permitted
to recover such damages up to fifty thousand dollars as equalled their
financial or pecuniary loss.
III.

INTERPRETATION OF THE VIRGINIA ACT

1871-1968

Early judicial interpretations of the Virginia Wrongful Death Statute
made it clear that it would be liberally construed. It was not necessary for
the deceased's personal representative to allege and file a statement of the
persons for whose benefit the action was being brought." Indeed, it was
not required that any particular member of the deceased's family survive
him, since the statute did not declare that the action was for the exclusive
benefit of any particular beneficiary or set of beneficiaries.
The phrase "fair and just" was given broad meaning from the beginning.2" Accepted instructions allowed the jury to consider the following
elements of damage in making its award: 2
18 Va. Acts of Assembly 1920, ch. 25, at 26.
19 John v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 199 Va. 63, 97 S.E.2d 723 (1957).
20
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
21 Cases cited note 12 supra.
22 Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Noell, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 394 (1879); Matthews v.
Warner, 70 Va. (29 Grat.) 570 (1877). See also Eisenhower v. Jeter, 205 Va. 159,
135 S.E.2d 786 (1964); Harris v. Royer, 165 Va. 461, 182 S.E. 276 (1935).
23 See Ratcliffe v. McDonald, 123 Va. 781, 97 S.E. 307 (1918); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v.
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1. The pecuniary loss sustained by survivors with reference to the probable earnings of the deceased in view of his health, age, business capacity
and experience;
2. The loss of the decedent's care, attention and society;
3. Such further sum as deemed fair and just by way of solace and comfort for the sorrow, suffering and mental anguish caused his survivors.
Considering these elements of damage in reverse order, solace meant
simply comfort in grief or an award for the alleviation of grief. Its recovery
was not limited to named beneficiaries but available, in the absence of such
beneficiaries, to other next of kin. Even actual proof of sorrow or suffering
by the deceased's beneficiaries was not necessary. The jury was given a right
to infer sorrow, suffering and mental anguish as a result of death.24 Where
no claim was made of pecuniary loss, the defense could not offer in mitigation of damages for solace any bad habits or improper morals of the
decedent.2" However, once the character of the decedent was put in issue
by the plaintiff, then the defendant was permitted to introduce evidence
to show the decedent's bad habits, bad morals, lack of sobriety or unhappy
relationship with his family. 6 Evidence of the magnitude and seriousness
of the decedent's injuries, the extent of mutilation to his body and other
circumstances likely to inflame, influence or prejudice the jury or invite
its sympathy were not admissible.2 7 Neither the mental anguish nor the
physical pain suffered by the decedent prior to his death were considered
elements of damage for solace.28
Beyond solace, the Virginia courts considered that the loss of decedent's
care, attention and society constituted a pecuniary loss. No proof of actual
financial deprivation was required. Damages were recoverable even if the
deceased was one whose life conferred no pecuniary benefit such as an aged
or infirm father or husband, an invalid wife or an afflicted child. 9 DepenGhee, 110 Va. 527, 66 S.E. 826 (1910); Pocahontas Collieries Co. v. Rukas, 104 Va. 278,
51 S.E. 449 (1905); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Cheatvood, 103 Va. 356, 49 S.E. 489 (1905);
Anderson v. Hygela Hotel Co., 92 Va. 687, 24 SE. 269 (1896); M. DoUBLES, E. EMROCH
& R. MERMGE, VIRGINIA JURY INSTRUCnONS § 23.08 (1964).
24
Virginia Transit v. Hill, 208 Va. 171, 156 S.E.2d 889 (1967).
25 Id.
20

Basham v. Terry, 199 Va. 817, 102 S.E.2d 285 (1958).
Breeding v. Johnson, 208 Va. 652, 159 S.E.2d 836 (1968).
28
See Seymour & Burford Corp. v. Richardson, 194 Va. 709, 75 SJE.2d 77 (1953);
Virginia Iron Co. v. Odle, 128 Va. 280, 105 SE. 107 (1920).
29
fBaltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Noel], 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 394 (1879).
27
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dency was not a condition precedent to the recovery of damages,3" and
a wealthy man could recover for the death of a destitute brother, child or
impoverished relative. During the 1952 session of the General Assembly,
a bill was offered to limit the award of damages to "fair and just pecuniary
injury resulting from such death." 3 1 The bill died in committee. Its purpose
may have been to eliminate any recovery for either solace or for loss of the
decedent's society and companionship.
Even if the bill to limit the award of damages to pecuniary injury had
passed, its practical effect would have been limited in view of the extremely
broad judicial interpretation which had been given to the term "pecuniary
loss." In a case involving the death of a 13 year old boy, the Supreme
Gourt of Appeals of Virginia offered this definition:
In view of the comprehensive language of the statute, the phrase
'pecuniary loss,' when used in an instruction in connection with what
damages are recoverable, is to be given liberal interpretation. When so
construed, it does not mean merely the loss of immediate monetary benefits, nor is it limited to the loss of pecuniary benefits susceptible of positiveproof and exact estimate. In addition to financial loss, it includes
present and prospective loss of services, nurture and care, and other
advantages and benefits of a pecuniary nature which have been cut off
or will probably be lost in the future by reason of the death of the person
from whom derived or from whom they might have been expected. 2
In some jurisdictions, where the death of a child is involved, recovery
is not allowed for pecuniary loss in the absence of proof of actual economic
loss to the survivors, the theory being that it is not the value of a human
life which is the criteria but the damage actually sustained by those surviving.33 This reasoning has been applied in cases involving recovery for
the death of an unborn child.34 Although the Virginia courts have denied
3O)Wolfe v. Lockhart, 195 Va. 479, 78 S.E.2d 654 (1953); Colonial Coal Co. v. Gass,
114 Va. 24, 75 S.E. 775 (1912).
31 Va. House Bill No. 229 (1952).

Gough v. Shaner, 197 Va. 572, 578-79, 90 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1955).
- Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Co., 383 Mich. 251, 174 N.W.2d 836 (1970); Zorn v.
Crawford, 252 S.C. 127, 165 S.E.2d 640 (1969). Prior to the 1969 amendment to its
32

33

statute, North Carolina required that pecuniary loss be shown by positive testimony.
Stetson v. Easterling, 274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C.
394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Scriven v. McDonald, 264 N.C. 727, 142 S.E.2d 585 (1965).
34

See, e.g., Panagopoulous v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.W. Va. 1969); White v.
Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969).
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recovery for the death of an unborn viable child,35 they have adopted a
liberal view regarding recovery for the loss of an infant. Even though the
child was too young at death to have worked for wages or to have established an earning capacity, substantial damages could be obtained for the
pecuniary loss occasioned by reason of the child's death. A child was not
precluded from recovery for loss suffered by reason of the fact that he was
born after the wrongful death of his father." Thus, whether infant or
adult, a beneficiary could recover prospective damages for the loss of a
deceased even if there had been no proof of contribution to the beneficiary's
support by the deceased at the time of death. If there was actual financial
or pecuniary loss sustained, it could be shown. 8 Punitive damages, however, were not allowed,39 and prior to 1968 there was no right to recover
for -any hospital, medical, ambulance or funeral services rendered the
deceased, although, arguably, they were expenses occasioned by the death."0
Where a claim was made for financial or pecuniary loss, evidence of the
character and habits of the deceased was considered admissible to prove
his worth to his survivors." The amount of damages recoverable could not
be reduced because of benefits received from collateral sources, and for
this reason evidence of insurance proceeds received by beneficiaries as a
result of the decedent's death was not admissible." The deceased's life expec35 Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969), colmnented on in
4 U. Ricm. L. REv. 322 (1970).

36 Gough v. Shaner, 197 Va. 572, 90 S.E.2d 171 (1955); Rarcliffe v. McDonald, 123
Va. 781, 97 S.E. 307 (1918); Colonial Coal Co. v. Gass, 114 Va. 24, 75 S.E. 775 (1912).
Virginia has allowed substantial recovery for infant deaths. See, e.g., Spruill v.
Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962). The Spndll decision involved the
death of a 14 month old infant. The verdict was for $20,000. In R. F. Trant, Inc. v.
Upton, 159 Va. 355, 165 S.E. 404 (1932), $10,000 was awarded for the death of a 4 year
old girl.
37 Chick Transit Corp. v. Edenton, 170 Va. 361, 196 S.E. 648 (1938).
38 See Jessee v. Slate, 196 Va. 1074, 86 S.E.2d 821 (1955), where evidence was
admitted that the decedent was receiving at his death a sum each month in Social
Security payments.
39 Wilson v. Whittaker, 207 Va. 1032, 154 S.F.2d 124 (1967).
For a discussion of
the right to punitive or exemplary damages in automobile wrongful death cases, see
Annor., 62 A.L.R.2d 813 (1958).
4
o Holey v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 805 (ED. Va. 1960); Conrad v.
Thompson, 195 Va. 714, 80 S.E.2d 561 (1954).
41 Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Lumpkins, 151 Va. 173, 144 S.E. 485 (1928).
42
Wahthew v. Davis, 201 Va. 557, 111 S.E.2d 784 (1960); Burks v. Webb, 199 Va.
296, 99 S.E.2d 629 (1957).
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tancy could be estimated by the jury and the production or introduction
of mortality tables was permissible but not required."
Although evidence of the loss sustained by the decedent's beneficiaries
was admissible regarding the quantum of damages, and the number and
ages of those surviving could be shown,44 evidence of the physical condition
of the beneficiaries, whether they were weak or strong, was considered
improper. 5 Of more significance, perhaps, for the purpose of the present
discussion, evidence of the pecuniary condition, whether rich or poor, of
either the deceased or his survivors was not considered admissible with
regard to the amount of damages to be awarded."' Once the jury had
returned its verdict settling the amount of damages awarded, evidence
of the physical or pecuniary condition of the decedent's beneficiaries was
permitted and considered material on the question of the apportionment
of such damages. In such cases, the trial court, upon request, was directed
to postpone the receipt of evidence of the physical or pecuniary condition
of the beneficiaries until after the jury had established the quantum of
damages. 7 If within the statutory limit, the jury's verdict assessing damages
was considered final and conclusive," 8 not to be set aside or disturbed unless
there could be a clear showing made that it was a result of passion, prejudice
or corruption. 9
Until 1968 the bench and bar could look to and rely upon a simple and
direct wrongful death statute relatively unchanged since its birth in 1871
which had been reviewed, explained and interpreted in a consistent manner
by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. As a result, there was little
anxiety, confusion or controversy as to what was provable in a wrongful
death action, what damages were recoverable, and which persons were
entitled to share in the jury's award.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE

1968

AMENDMENT

A cursory examination of the 1968 amendment to Section 8-636 might
43 Gough v. Shaner, 197 Va. 572, 90 S.E.2d 171 (1955); Norfolk &
Phillips, 100 Va. 362, 41 S.E. 726 (1902).
44
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Sherman, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 602 (1878).
45 Crawford v. Hite, 176 Va. 69, 10 S.E.2d 561 (1940).
46See Matthews v. Hicks, 197 Va. 112, 87 S.E.2d 629 (1955); Colonial
Gass, 114 Va. 24, 75 S.E. 775 (1912); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Ghee, 110
S.E. 826 (1910).
47
Crawford v. Hite, 176 Va. 69, 10 S.E.2d 561 (1940).
48See Highway Express Lines, Inc. v. Fleming, 185 Va. 666, 40 S.E.2d
Chick Transit Corp. v. Edenton, 170 Va. 361, 196 S.E. 648 (1938).
49 Harris v. Royer, 165 Va. 461, 182 S.E. 276 (1935).

W.

Ry. v.

Coal Co. v.
Va. 527, 66

294 (1946);
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lead the reader to believe that its purpose was to increase the amount of
damages recoverable in a wrongful death action. There is considerable
doubt that this result was achieved in all cases.
Instead of a general award of damages considered fair and just in an
amount not in excess of $40,000, the jury now may award such damages
for solace as may seem fair and just not exceeding $25,000. Since solace
has been singled out as a special and separate item of damages, it would
appear that recovery for this element of damages is exclusively a recovery

for the sorrow and grief of the decedent's survivors and cannot be expanded
to include other matters such as loss of the decedent's care, attention and
society. Another problem may exist. Section 8-638 of the Code, not
amended in 1968, still provides that any amount recovered shall be assets
in the hands of the personal representative to be disposed of according to
law in the absence of named statutory beneficiaries. However, the new
Section 8-636 provides that no recovery shall be assets of the decedent's
estate. In the absence of surviving class beneficiaries, can there be any
recovery on behalf of more remote next of kin for solace? Presumably, prior
precedent will be followed and the next of kin will not be denied compensation for solace. A convincing argument certainly can be made that the new
language of Section 8-636 merely protects any recovery from creditors and
was not intended to limit a recovery of solace to those specifically mentioned in the preferred and deferred classes of beneficiaries. But if this argument is accepted, little reason can be seen for the inclusion of new language.
The problems of recovery for solace are minor ones, as are those pertaining to the recovery of funeral, ambulance, medical and hospital expenses, although the direction that the personal representative apportion
any recovery for hospital, medical and ambulance expenses could cause
difficulty should the jury not see fit to award the full amount of the expenses proven at the trial.
The major difficulty with the 1968 amendment to Section 8-636 will
arise when damages in excess of the $25,000 recoverable for solace are
sought. Normally, when a statute provides for recovery of financial or
pecuniary loss, proof of dependency is not a prerequisite." Prior to 1968,
this was the rule in Virginia.5" However, the new statute has made dependency a condition precedent to recovery of any part of the $50,000 which
may be awarded for financial or pecuniary loss. If it can be shown that
50 See S.Spusm,

REcoVERY FOR WRoNGFUr.
DEATH, 582-83 (1966).
Wolfe v. Lockhart, 195 Va. 479, 78 S.E.2d 654 (1953); Colonial Coal Co. v. Gass,
114 Va. 24, 75 S.E. 775 (1912).
51
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the deceased was a wage-earning head of a household with a dependent
wife and children, little trouble will be encountered; but if he was unemployed, ill, infirm, senile, or an infant and no one was actually dependent
upon him, at least in the sense of economic dependency, then a serious
problem will be encountered in the recovery of any amount in excess of the
damages allowable for solace.
The accepted definitions of dependent and dependency all appear to have
a financial connotation, whether in a legaP2 or a non-legal 3 context. The
decided cases also have considered dependency to be measured by an economic yardstick. Thus, it is held that the dependency must be present and
actual, amounting to a want or need on the part of the decedent; that is,
an actual dependence coupled with a reasonable expectation of support
or a reasonable claim to support." It is not anticipated dependency or future
expectation of pecuniary loss that counts but rather the condition of dependency existing at the time of the decedent's death. An excellent and comprehensive analysis of the type of dependency needed under wrongful death
statutes specifically requiring its existence is found in the case of Duval v.
Hunt,5 5 where the court stated:
We think that when the suit is brought by a person who bases his right
to recover upon the fact that he is dependent upon the deceased for support, then he must show, regardless of any ties of relationship or strict
legal right to such support, that he or she was, either from the disability
of age, or nonage, physical or mental incapacity, coupled with the lack
52BAci's LAW DICnONARY 524 (4th ed. 1951), defines "dependency" as "[a] relation
between two persons, where one is sustained by another or looks to or relies on aid
of another for support or for reasonable necessaries consistent with dependent's position
in life."
"Partial dependency" is defined in BALLENTimE's LAW DIcnoNARY 915 (3d ed. 1969)
in the following manner:
The status of a person who depends upon another for part of his support and
maintenance. The status of a person who has some means but not sufficient for
his support.
53

WFBsR's TisD NEw INTERNATiONAL DIMCONARY, 604 (1968).

54See Burgh v. Carroll, 217 So. 2d 353 (Fla. App. 1969); Wadsworth v. Friend,
201 So. 2d 641 (Fla. App. 1967).

55 Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85, 90, 15 So. 876, 881 (1894). In Rust v. Holland, 15 Ill.
App. 2d 369, 146 N.E.2d 82 (1957), the court defined "dependency" as follows:
The word 'dependency' implies a present existing relation between two persons
where one is sustained by another or looks to or relies on the aid of another
for support or for reasonable necessaries consistent with the dependent's position
in life.
Id. at 371, 146 N.E.2d at 84.
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of property means, dependent in fact upon the deceased for a support.
There must be, when adults claim such dependence, an actual inability
to support themselves, and an actual dependence upon someone else for
support, coupled with a reasonable expectation of support, or with some
reasonable claim to support, from the deceased.
The circumstances must be sufficient to establish that on the date of the
decedent's death there was some degree of dependency and necessitous want
on the part of the claimant together with a recognition of that necessity
on the part of the deceased. Although there are cases which hold that a
statute establishing a legal obligation of support may provide dependency
and proof of pecuniary loss,"8 the majority view is that dependency, under
wrongful death statutes, means dependency in fact rather than a strict legal
dependency or legal requirement of support."r
Although the dependency must be actual rather than legal, it is not necessary to show that the claimant was totally dependent upon the deceased.
A partial dependency will suffice as long as it consists of substantial contributions by the decedent and corresponding reliance upon such contributions.5" Even a relatively small contribution in terms of overall need, if made
on a regular basis and if required and relied upon by the beneficiary for his
or her maintenance, will establish partial dependency. However, occasional
gifts or contributions will not suffice.59 Payments for board, lodging or other
accommodations and mere gifts, donations, or acts of generosity by children
to parents, standing alone, are not sufficient to establish dependency on the
6 Thompson v. Board of Rd. Comm'rs, 357 Mich. 482, 98 N.W.2d 620 (1959). But cf.
Noble v. Edberg, 252 Iowa 135, 106 N.WV.2d 102 (1960).
57
See, e.g., Novak v. Chicago & Calumet Dist. Transit Co., 235 Ind. 489, 135 N.E.2d 1
(1956); MacDonald v. Quimby, 350 Mich. 21, 85 N.W.2d 157 (1957); Domijan v. Harp.,
340 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 1960); Wente v. Shaver, 350 Mo. 1143, 169 S.W.2d 947 (1943).
5S See Bohrnan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 23 NJ. Super. 399, 93 A.2d 190 (1952); Joski v.
Short, 1 Wash. 2d 454, 96 P.2d 483 (i939); Estes v. Shulte, 146 Wash. 688, 264 P. 990
(1928).
59See In re Updike's Heirs, 282 P.2d 230 (Okla. 1955); Turon v. J. & L. Constr. Co.,
8 N.J. 543, 86 A.2d 192 (1952). In the Updike case, it was asserted that the deceased's
grandsons were her dependents. The evidence disclosed that the deceased was very
thoughtful of and generous to them, that she had stayed with and taken care of them
when the occasion demanded and that she had made numerous gifts of clothing to them.
In rejecting the claim that the grandsons were the deceased's dependents, the court said:
But, it takes much more than that to establish dependency. The children lived
with and constituted the family of their father and mother. He, the father, was
president of the company which was doing a good business at the time of his
death and he received no financial aid from his mother other than the clothes
which she gave the children.
In re Updike's Heirs, 282 P.2d 230, 232 (Okla. 1955).
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part of the recipient.6" In one case the court, in declining to find any dependency where a 25 year old son had lived separate and apart from his
parents, had visited them a few times each year and had occasionally made
cash gifts to them. The court commented:
This evidence does not, in our opinion, establish such a support or dependency as is contemplated by the statute. It shows nothing more than
such gifts as countless sons occasionally bestow upon their parents, with
no thought of dependency, nor that it is a gift of necessity. Our statute
means something more, while we would not give it such a strict construction as to say it means wholly dependent, or that the parent must have
no means of support or livelihood other than the deceased, such a construction being too harsh and not in accordance with the humane purpose of the act. Nevertheless, there must be some degree of dependency,
some substantial dependency, a necessitous want on the part of the
parent, and a recognition of that necessity on the part of the child. 1
Contributions in the form of money or negotiable securities are not essential. It is sufficient if the dependency rests upon the performance by the
deceased of some service or duty for the beneficiary.6" In such cases, the
evidence should show the need for the service togefher with the performance of it on a regular basis. The dgree of the dependence is not as important as the fact that it is more than the mere receipt of occasional benefits
and services. 3 The duties performed or services rendered must be in the
nature of needed or required assistance and there must be an expectation
of the continuation of such services and a reliance upon them by the recipient. In this connection, evidence of the financial condition of the beneficiaries and of their health and physical condition at the time of the decedent's death may be admissible at the trial prior to a determination of the
amount of the award either to establish dependency or pecuniary loss or
both.64 This, of course, would represent a distinct departure from prior case
law in Virginia on this point.
As indicated, the dependency required, whether total or partial or in the
00
See Kirkpatrick v. Bowyer, 131 Ind. App. 86, 169 N.E.2d 409 (1960); Bottle v.
Northern Pac. Ry., 60 Wash. 552, 111 P. 788 (1910).
61
Borde v. Northern P. Ry., 60 Wash. 552, 553, 111 P. 788, 789 (1910).
02 Hogan v. Williams, 193 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 942
(1952); Savannah Elec. Co. v. Thomas, 30 Ga. App. 405, 118 S.E. 481 (1923); Carianni v.
Schwenker, 38 N.J. Super. 350, 118 A.2d 847 (1955); Clement v. Cummings, 212 Ore.
161, 317 P.2d 579 (1957).
63
Bohrman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 23 N.J. Super. 399, 93 A.2d 190 (1952).
04
See Paragon Ref. Co. v. Higbea, 220 Ohio App. 440, 153 NE. 860 (1925);
Cincinnati St. Ry. v. Altemeier, 60 Ohio St. 10, 53 N.E. 300 (1899).
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form of cash contributions, services rendered or duties performed, must
be of an economic nature. Emotional or psychological dependency, even
if clearly established, will not meet the test.65 Dependency predicated upon
the deceased's companionship, attention and society or upon his advice,
instruction and physical, moral and intellectual training and guidance will
not qualify.
If recovery of damages in excess of $25,000 is sought for the wrongful
death of a child, it must be shown that the deceased child actually contributed to his parents in either money or services in order to establish
dependency and financial or pecuniary loss.6 The difficulty is illustrated
by the situation presented in Grant v. Libby, McNeill & Libby,67 where
a mother sought damages for the death of her 14 year old daughter. The
deceased's father had deserted his family and her mother had supported
herself and her two daughters by domestic service and seasonal farm work.
Evidence was produced to show that the deceased on several occasions had
taken babysitting jobs and had delivered the $1.00 to $1.50 earned to her
mother. She had also done some farming work but had earned little. The
daughter was shown to be very affectionate and a bright scholar, her
intention being to finish high school and then to become a stenographer
and assist in the support and maintenance of her mother and younger sister.
The court in refusing to find dependency, quoted from an earlier Washington case with respect to claims of prospective or future dependency:
The right of recovery in this class of cases depends upon a condition,
05 A somewhat different view is expressed in Lambert, Comments on Recent Important
Personal Injury (Torts) Cases, 18 NACCA L.J. 288, 378 (1956), regarding the damages
which should be recoverable for the loss of a child:
The death of a minor child is a deep emotional wounding, and it may be admitted that there is a decided tendency for the law to compensate for the
grievous injury to family feelings involved in the death of such children or,
phrased otherwise, to place a money value upon the lost companionship, deprived
presence, and the co-adventuring implicit in the parent-child relationship. This
enlarged view suggests that these deprivations are 'services,' financially compensable, lost to the survivors of the deceased child.
See also Corman v. Weg Dial Tel. Inc., 194 Kan. 783, 402 P.2d 112 (1965).
36Thompson v. Board of Rd. Comm'rs, 357 Mich. 482, 98 N.W.2d 620 (1959). The
case involved a 15 year old girl who had worked and contributed $5.00 per week to
her parents and who performed cooking, washing and general housework for the
family to the extent of 4 to 6 hours of work each day. Dependency was considered
established.
Prior to 1952 in Georgia a father could not maintain an action for the death of an
infant child who was at the time of death incapable of rendering the father any
service. Kehely v. Kehely, 200 Ga. 41, 36 S.E.2d 155 (1945). See generally Annot.,
14 A.L.R.2d 485 (1950).
67 145 Wash. 31, 258 P. 842 (1927).
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and not upon a promise-if it may be so called-made by the deceaseda promise that has been made by all boys from the time they were old
enough to fashion their affection into words, and repeated until the
course of nature leads them from the family root tree to set up an establishment of their own. Such utterances are not evidence of anything,
unless they have something to operate on. Upon a showing of dependence, absolute or partial, such words may be considered in connection
with the natural impulse which prompts every child to shield a parent
from the wants and perils of age. A child might indeed remain with and,
in a sense, care for, his parents in old age, and yet they might not be
dependents in the sense in which that term is used in the law. It is a
pretty sentiment, but no one is deceived by it but the child, and his
deception is usually short-lived. . . . Such pictures of filial piety are
inestimable moral examples, beautiful to contemplate, but the law has no
standard by which to measure their loss.6s
Even when children seek to recover for the wrongful death of a parent,
the relationship of parent and child, standing alone, will not suffice, it being
necessary to show that the child in fact was dependent upon the parent
at the time of the parent's death. 9
If the deceased was incompetent or mentally retarded or a patient in a
mental hospital, there can be no recovery where dependency and pecuniary
loss are required unless it can be shown that his eventual recovery and a
resumption of his support were probable."0 In one instance involving the
death of a child while confined in a mental hospital, recovery of damages
on behalf of the child's mother was denied, since her right to recover was
contingent upon a showing of actual dependency upon the child for support
and actual contribution to the mother's support by the child at the time
of the wrongful death.' It was pointed out that although the child may
have contributed to his mother's support prior to his confinement, at the
date of his death he was making no contribution and his condition and
confinement were of uncertain duration.
The decided cases in this area may seem to reach harsh and unjust results
in many situations. However, it must be remembered that the basis for the
denial of recovery is the language of the wrongful death acts requiring proof
Kanton v. Kelley, 65 Wash. 614, 616, 118 P. 890, 892 (1911).
0 See Rust v. Holland, 15 Ill. App. 2d 369, 146 N.E.2d 82 (1957). The same result
obtains in workmen's compensation cases where dependency is a statutory requirement.
Copple v. Bowlin, 172 Neb. 467, 110 N.W.2d 117 (1961); Kosmicki v. Aspen Drilling
Co.,
76 N.M. 234, 414 P.2d 214 (1966).
70
See Lange v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 777 (N.D.N.Y. 1960); Brawner v.
Bussell, 50 Ga. App. 843, 179 SE. 231 (1935).
71 Brawner v. Bussell, 50 Ga. App. 843, 179 S.E. 231 (1935).
68
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of economic dependency. The requirement of dependency is not limited
to wrongful death statutes but has found favor and acceptance in related
areas. Under the Federal Employees Liability Act,"2 the recovery of damages
by the deceased employee's next of kin is conditioned upon dependency
being both pleaded and proven,73 and the term pecuniary loss is not interpreted as encompassing the loss of the deceased's society or companionship. 4
The Jones Act,7" enacted to benefit the survivors of seamen, provides that
the deceased's personal representative may maintain an action for damages
for his death. Again, where next of kin are concerned, dependency must be
shown.7" The Death on The High Seas by Wrongful Act statute 77 permits
a decedent's personal representative to maintain a suit for damages for the
benefit of his "wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative." Proof
that relatives were at least partially financially dependent upon the deceased
at the time of his death is essential.78 Workmen's compensation statutes often
require proof of dependency and, where required, it must be shown as
actual dependency existing at the time of the deceased worker's death. 9
Under Virginia's Workmen's Compensation Act, ° dependency upon the
deceased employee is made a criterion of recovery. Section 65.1-66 sets forth
those persons conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent, and its provisions control regardless of whether or not there is evidence of actual dependency."' In the absence of these conclusive statutory presumptions, Section
65.1-67 provides:
In all other cases questions of dependency in whole or in part shall
be determined in accordance with the facts as the facts are at the time
of the accident; but no allowance shall be made for any payment made
in lieu of board and lodging or services and no compensation shall be
allowed unless the dependency existed for a period of three months or
more prior to the accident.
It should be noted that under Section 65.1-67, dependency rests not upon
7245 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-59 (1954).
73 Durham v. Southern Ry., 254 F. Supp. 813 (W.D. Va. 1966); Hopps v. Chesnut,

324 Mich. 256, 36 N.W.2d 908 (1949).
74Chafin v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 80 W. Va. 703, 93 S.E. 822 (1917).
75 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (1958).
76Bailey v. Baltimore Mail S.S. Co., 43 F. Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
77 46 U.S.C.A. § 761 (1958).
78
First Nat. Bank v. National Airlines, Inc., 288 F.2d 621 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 859 (1961); In re Risdal & Anderson, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 353 (D. Mass. 1968).
79

Copple v. Bowlin, 172 Neb. 467, 110 N.W.2d 117 (1961); Kosmicki v. Aspen

Drilling Co., 76 N.M. 234, 414 P.2d 214 (1966).
80
VA. CoDE AiNi. §§ 65.1-65 to -67 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
s Basham v. R. H. Lowe, Inc., 176 Va. 485, 11 S.E.2d 638 (1940).
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relationship or presumption, but upon the facts as they existed at the time
of death.82 In determining what type and degree of dependence satisfies the
statutory requirement, the Virginia workmen's compensation cases have
held that to establish dependency it must be shown that the deceased employee contributed with some degree of regularity to the person claiming
to be a dependent and that such contributions were relied upon by the
claimant for reasonable necessaries consistent with his or her station in life. 3
To summarize, the criteria for recovery of financial or pecuniary loss has
changed radically. Reliance upon a loss of society, companionship and beneficial instruction and guidance will be misplaced. To qualify as a beneficiary
entitled to an award for financial or pecuniary loss, one must have been
dependent upon the decedent in at least some degree for financial assistance
or its equivalent in services at the time the wrongful death occurred.

V.

THE POST-1968 WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION

When the cause of action arises subsequent to July 1, 1968, the motion
for judgment should be more detailed and specific. Good pleading now
requires that the plaintiff allege that there was a funeral bill in excess of
$500.00 and that there were other specified hospital, medical and ambulance services expenses. Solace in the amount of $25,000 should be asked
for separately and the beneficiaries listed if they fall within either the preferred or deferred classes. Dependency might well occupy a separate paragraph with each dependent listed and an allegation that because of such
dependency the dependent or dependents are entitled to the sum of $50,000
which equals the financial or pecuniary loss sustained.
If the fact of dependency is to be in issue, consideration should be given
by defense counsel to disposing of this controversy prior to the trial date,
or, if at the trial, in the absence of the jury. This, of course, will be possible
only where the evidence is clear and uncontradicted and where dependency
does not present an issue of fact for the jury. If the plaintiff can present
a factual issue regarding dependency, then the jury would hear evidence
of the physical and pecuniary condition of the alleged dependents prior
to making its award. This might benefit the dependents and increase the
amount of the verdict but would not be welcomed by the defense. If dependency is not established sufficiently, a motion to strike the evidence
regarding any recovery of the $50,000 should be successful. Even so, if the
82 Commonwealth v. McGuire, 188 Va. 444, 50 SE.2d 284 (1948); Virginia Elec. &
Power Co. v. Place, 150 Va. 562, 143 S.E. 756 (1928).
83 Glassco v. Glassco, 195 Va. 239, 77 S.E.2d 843 (1953).
197 Va. 194, 89 S.E.2d 44 (1955).

See also Dunivan v. Hunter,
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jury has heard evidence of the physical or pecuniary condition of alleged
dependents, it could be influenced to some extent in its award of solace
if the person claiming to be a dependent also qualifies as a statutory beneficiary or next of kin.
A suggested jury instruction for use under the new statute is set forth
in Appendix A in the hope that it may be of some value to trial counsel.
It should be noted that the jury may be confused as to its function since
it is required to distribute all or any part of the $50,000 but is given an
option with respect to the $25,000 awardable for solace. A form verdict
may be helpful and may serve to avoid confusion and controversy. A suggested form verdict is set forth in Appendix B. It may be difficult during
the trial to keep the proof of damages for solace separate from the proof
of damages for pecuniary loss to dependents. Perhaps the jury, being sensible laymen, will have an easier time with this than will the courts and the
bar.
VI. 1970 PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS
Efforts were made during the 1970 session of the Virginia General
Assembly to amend Section 8-636. One proposed bill8 ' would have
amended and reenacted Section 8-636 in the same form as it existed prior
to the 1968 change, the only difference being that the proposed bill included
no statutory limit on the amount of damages recoverable. Another proposed
amendment 5 would have reverted to the pre-1968 language of Section
8-636, imposed a statutory limit of $75,000, specified that in the absence
of named statutory beneficiaries any award should be distributed to more
remote kindred according to the law of descent and distribution, and allowed a recovery of funeral expenses not exceeding one thousand dollars
and the actual hospital, medical and ambulance expenses incurred by the
decedent as a result of the wrongful act. Both of these bills would have
permitted the jury again to award such damages as it deemed fair and just
under the evidence presented. Neither bill passed the Virginia House or
Senate.
One bill, 6 patterned after the 1969 North Carolina Wrongful Death
Statute, did pass the House. The language of the pre-1968 Section 8-636
was reenacted with a statutory limit of $100,000. The jury was permitted
to award damages based upon what might seem fair and just, but the bill
went considerably further and specified as follows:
84 Va.House Bill No. 344 (1970).
85 Va.House Bill No. 396 (1970).
80
Committee Amendment In The Nature of a Substitute For Va. House Bill No. 344
(1970).
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(a) Damages recoverable for death by wrongful act include:
(1) Expenses for care, treatment and hospitalization incident to
the injury resulting in death.
(2) Compensation for pain and suffering of the decedent.
(3) The reasonable funeral expenses of the decedent.
(4) The present monetary value of the decedent to the persons
entitled to receive the damages recovered, including but not
limited to compensation for the loss of the reasonably expected:
a. Net income of the decedent.
b. Services, protection, care and assistance of the decedent,
whether voluntary or obligatory, to the persons entitled to the
damages recovered.
c. Society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and
advice of the decedent to the persons entitled to the damages
recovered.
(5) Sorrow, mental anguish, and solace.
(b) All evidence which reasonably tends to establish any of the elements of damages included in subsection (a), or otherwise reasonably tends to establish the present monetary value of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive the damages recovered,
is admissible in an action for damages for death by wrongful act.
The Senate rejected the form of this House bill, perhaps on the grounds
that its terms would be to generous to prospective plaintiff's counsel. Whatever the reason for the rejection of each of the proposed amendments, the
1970 General Assembly failed to take advantage of an opportunity to return
to the world of fair and just damages for those aggrieved by wrongful death
and to eliminate actual economic dependency as a condition precedent to
an award in excess of $25,000. Perhaps during the 1972 session, some
newly revised and more acceptable amendment will obtain the endorsement
of both houses of the Virginia Legislature.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Although ostensibly the 1968 amendment to Section 8-636 increases the
statutory damage limit from $40,000 to $75,000, the recovery of damages
now may be more difficult to obtain. The amendment, which was designed
to liberalize recovery, has created more problems than it has solved and
in practice often will impair rather than help those seeking recovery of
damages for wrongful death. An amendment in 1972 is needed, and hopefully, will be forthcoming.
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APPENDIX A
THE COURT INSTRUCTS THE JURY that if from the evidence and
the other instructions of the Court you find your verdict in- favor of the
plaintiff, you may award damages with reference to the following:
1. The actual funeral expenses of the decedent, not exceeding $500.00,
and the actual hospital, medical and ambulance service expenses incurred by the decedent as a result of the defendant's act.
2. Such damages as to you may seem fair and just by way of solace for
sorrow, suffering and mental anguish occasioned by the death of the
decedent to the following persons, not to exceed a total of $25,000.00:
(list statutory beneficiaries and relationship to decedent)
The jury may, but are not required to, direct in what proportion any
such damages for solace shall be distributed to such persons.
3. Such further damages, not exceeding a total of $50,000.00, as shall
equal the financial or pecuniary loss, if any, sustained by the dependent or dependents of the decedent.
The jury shall direct in what proportion any such damages for
financial or pecuniary loss shall be distributed to such dependents.
APPENDIX B
We, the jury, on the issue joined, find in favor of the plaintiff and affix
the damages as follows:
1. $........................ actual funeral expenses (not to exceed $500.00); and
$........................ actual hospital, medical and ambulance service expenses;
and
2. $........................ by way of solace to the following (List statutory beneficiaries and relationship).
We elect to distribute such sum as follows:
Name

Relationship

Amount

.....................................................................................................................

..............................

.....................................................................................................................

..............................

.....................................................................................................................

..............................
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3. $ ........................ by way of financial or pecuniary loss sustained by the
following dependent or dependents of the decedent.
This sum shall be distributed as follows:

Amount

Name of Dependent

$..........................

$.................. ....
$............
Foreman

.

.

